TIT BITS

TIT-BITS

s.3 and s.3 of the Fraud Act 2006 overlap since D could be charged for both offence.

A person acts recklessly within the meaning of s.1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with respect to:

(i) a circumstance which he is aware of a risk that exist of will exist
(ii) a result when he is aware of the risk that it will occur

and it is in this circumstances known to him unreasonable to take that risk.

Proposed reform

A person acts recklessly with respect to:

(iii) a circumstance, which he is aware of a risk that exist of will exist
(iv) a result when he is aware of the risk that it will occur

and it is in unreasonable, having regard to the circumstances known to him, to take that risk.

s.8 and Morgan do establish that a failure to foresee consequences, whether reasonable or (Morgan) which negative mens rea of the offence require acquittal where the offence does not requires mens rea .

Ghosh Test: (i) Would ordinary reasonable person consider D action to be dishonest? (ii) Did D realised that her action would be so regarded?

Theft: s.1 of Theft Act 1958; Gomez; Morris)

Duress: Graham (reasonable belief in relation to Duress); any avenue of excape? Heath and Hassan. The jury must judge D’s action by the standard of reasonable firmness. Self defence would not apply for theft

S.20 Malicious wounding; Morriary v Brooks (1834) a break in the continuity of the skin. Mowatt (1967) D must be aware that his conduct carried a risk of harm albeit not serious; Savage and Parmenter (1991); Mander (1985). S.20 is alternative to s.18 (requires specific intent); inflicting/causing is wide.

S.47 Assault: Fagan v MPC (1996)

Battery: Rolfe (1936) infliction of unlawful violence. ABH – any injury likely interfere with heath and comfort. Miller (1934); Roberts (1971); no foresight is required of
Appropriation: Gomez and Hinks: assuming the right of the owner is theft
Murder: Moloney (Definition) Saunder (Intention) Woolin (1998)

Constructive Manslaughter (Church): Dangerous and unlawful act which causes death of another (Goodfellow (1986); Newbury (1977); The question of whether the unlawful act is dangerous in an objective one (Church [1976]); Willoughby (2004) D may be guilty of offence via more than 1 route.

Gross negligent Manslaughter (Adamako): Duty of care, negligent of that duty and negligence cause death. Contractual duty (Pittwood), voluntary assumption (Stone and Debbinson)

Reckless Manslaughter (Lidar (2000): D foresaw a risk of death or serious harm not that either consequence was virtually certain to result (Lidar); Cooper (2004); Dudley (1989)

Provocation: Duffy, Ahluwalia, Thorton (sudden and temporary loss of control); Doughty – provocation need not come from deceased. S.3 of Homicide Act 1957

Diminished responsibility: s.(2) of Homicide Act 1957. Byrne (1960); Durbar (1958) burden on defence on balance of probabilities; defence supported by psychiatric evidence - Dix (1981); Dietschmann (1993) intoxication does not erode defence.

Intoxication: is denial of mens rea. Beard (mistake and evidence of intoxication). Very difficult defence. Majewski (1981) voluntary intoxication

Sexual Assault : ss.1-4; Sexual offence Act ss. 74-75 (Presumptions). S.78 consent. Dica, Gonzani (sex and infection of HIV); Tabassum (fraud as to consent of the act) Copper and Schaub (withdrawn consent).

Criminal Damage: s.1(1) of criminal Damage Act 1971. Lloyd, Drake (what constitute damage); s.1(2) aggravated criminal damage (danger to life)

R v G: If D foresaw a risk that a life would be endangered as a result of the damage, the she is reckless. Caldwell (inadvertent) recklessness overruled and Cunningham (advertent) recklessness is the law. The doctrine of transferred malice cannot apply to criminal damage. S.5(2) defence. Jaggard and Dickson (1980); honest belief will suffice.

Causation: Malcherek and steel (1981): Bonafide decision of medial personnel will not break the chain of causation.

Defence of Consent: Attorney General Reference (No. 6 of 1980) & Brown (1983) consent to injury subject to public policy exception; Wilson

GBH s.18. Serious injury (Smith (1961); Sounder (1985); intention and knowledge that GBH is a virtual certain consequences (Bryson).

S.24 Malicious administration : Gillard (1998) spraying; Marcus (1981) noxious definition; Morison (1989) malicious bear subjective reasoning.