ESSAY - CAUSATION

CAUSATION

Problem of causation; amplifier shorting looks like an intervening negligent act and not foreseeable. If there is causation then A has committed a s.47 offence (Miller (1954) 2 QB 282). Bad bruise looks like s.47, but it would not be grievous bodily harm, nor wound, so it would neither be s.20 or s.18. G caused E to break his leg, it is irrelevant through the ‘thin skull’ principle that the leg is weak (Blaue (1975) 1 WLR 1411. Inflicted now means caused: Ireland and Burstow (1997) QB 114 – s.20 offence, GBH s.18. Discussion on Dear, Corbett (1996) Crim LR 594 Battery (Indirect) [Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54] S.47; Battery occasioning injury Sufficiency of immediacy (Smith v Woking Police (1983) Crim LR 323. Psychic and physical assaults are different offences s.18 - serious injury (maliciously is swallowed up by the ulterior intent – if you have intention to GBH, then you are malicious). Does H intend or reckless toward ‘some harm’ – Mowatt (1968) 1 QB 421. Comments about wound, occasioning and causing, inflicting, technical meaning of malicious, the Mowatt point and double ulterior intent point in s.18

Actus reus or Rape, Assault, s.47, 20 and 18. Common assault – You can consent to battery and that makes it lawful; so s.47 is ruled out. You cannot consent to more than Actual bodily harm (Brown) unless there is some ‘public justification’ such as reasonable necessary surgery, boxing. D foresees the likelihood of harm (Mowatt) and liable under s.20. If he intends GBH (seems unlikely) then s.18 Even if he is drunk, he cannot raise defence of drunkenness since s.20 is a basic intent. s.18 because it is a crime of specific intent. Do not go into the examination not knowing each element of the actus reus of each offence.

It is not criminal offence to be unfaithful or have mistress. Putting fear of immediate battery is a common law assault – Read v Coker: conditional intention was still held to be an intention. He shouted this out and the actus reus is complete. Does Harry intends of foresee Lemon to be afraid? If so Harry has committed assault s.47 liability Wound and infliction of grievous bodily harm with foresight of some bodily harm (Mowatt) s.20. Harry probably committed psychic assault, battery s.47 (in two ways, reflecting the two different assault). S.18, harm

The main fault of the poorer answer for this question was lack of specificity in saying what offence H has committed. Let us assume H cased that injury. He is probably guilty of psychic assault by intentionally or causing I to apprehend an immediate battery. Battery (Indirect) [Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54]. S.47; Battery occasioning injury. Sufficiency of immediacy (Smith v Woking Police (1983) Crim LR 323. Psychic and physical assaults are different offences. s.18 - serious injury (maliciously is swallowed up by the ulterior intent – if you have intention to GBH, then you are malicious). Second intent, while resisting arrest. s.20 – Grievous bodily harm. Does H intend or reckless toward ‘some harm’ – Mowatt (1968) 1 QB 421
of the Offences Against the Person Act (1891) - wound and grievous bodily harm. Comments about wound, occasioning and causing, inflicting, technical meaning of malicious, the Mowatt point and double ulterior intent point in s.18

Smith (1959) and Cheshire (1991) – Medical negligence would not break the chain of causation. Smith (1959) - If hospitalised victim of an attack contracted a fatal infection purely by accident, the death of the victim would not be attributed to the defendant. Factual causation and ‘but for’ ‘deminimis’ test. Legal causation Operative and significant cause. Reasonable foreseeability Intervening Act. Think skull principle. The level of control the defendant had over the chain of events that ‘factually’ led to the injury – Dear (1996) Crim LR 595. A good criticism of this case is that the unpredictable behaviour of the victim, in not getting adequate medical care attention for injuries inflicted on him by Dear, meant Dear could not have caused the subsequent worsening of and then death of the victim. That reasonable sounding criticism is that because Dear could not have foreseen that the victim might do this he was not morally responsible.

Thing skull principle cannot also be criticized from the same point of view; one cannot reasonably foresee that a victim might fall into that relatively rare category. Dear and thin skull cases place a moral burden on potential criminal offenders not to take risks; this is to employ the morally evaluative reasoning behind strict liability offences.