LAW OF CONTRACT - GENERAL ESSAY

It is important to firstly establish if all the pre-requisite legal requirements for a valid contract are present in the relationship between Andrew and the other parties involved in the question. The requirements are a valid offer duly communicated by the offeror to the offeree, acceptance and consideration. Where all these elements are present the court will find the existence of a valid contract as in the case of Storer v Manchester City Council (1974) while the absence of a valid offer led to the non-recognition of the alleged contract in Gibson v Manchester City Council (1979). I will begin with Andrew’s offer. Generally advertisements are considered invitation to threat, rather than offers because of commercial difficulties that would attend any other sort of construction (Partridge v Crittenden (1968). Any other interpretation would create anarchy of unimaginable proportion most especially in this recent time where newspapers are available to millions of readers both online and in printed copies. Unilateral offers, where advertised or communicated through other means, could however be made to whosoever come in contact with the information and perform the act(s) required. The advertisement by Andrew to pay a reward of £10,000 appears to the person who found his dog is an offer when considered in the light of the principle set out in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893). The acceptance of such offer is the performance of the act required in the advert. There is also no need to communicate acceptance of the offer to the offeror, what is required is the performance of the act specified by the offeror. We will now examine if any of the offerees accepted and took steps to enjoy the benefits of the contract.

To start with, Charles made attempt to accept the offer, but his attempt appears unsuccessful since he failed to find Buddy, the lost dog. His purchase of £500 equipment fell short of the conditions specified in the offer – recovery on the lost.

Darwin on the hand found the dog the dog at a time when he was not aware of the offer. The question at the point is can there be a contract where there was offer matched by corresponding acceptance. Put differently, could Darwin perform a contract in the ignorance of an offer? The law appears to be ambiguous on this issue. In Williams v Cardawardine (1833) and Gibbons v Proctor (1891) the court answered yes in situation where the offeree performed what was required by the offeror. However in R v Clarke (1927) the court on the basis of the motive ruled performance did not amount to acceptance. Andrew revoked the offer on Thursday, through a medium which was radically different from the medium use to announce the offer. Was the revocation effective? The answer appears to be ‘no’ in view of the fact that revocation of an offer must be communicated to be effective as decided by the courts in these cases i.e. Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880), Henthorn v Fraser (1892). Shuey v USA (1875). Revocation of Andrew’s offer in a newspaper advert must reach substantially the same audience as the offer. On balance it is more realistic to assume that Andrew’s revocation not adequate. If the offer was still subsisting and Darwin performed the act specified in the offer, Andrew is bound by the specified terms to give the reward. On the other hand If Andrew has successfully revoked his offer, Darwin cannot claim the reward as the offer has been revoked.

In the situation where Darwin’s duty is the village dog keeper, it is unlikely that would be any consideration to support a contract as Darwin only performed his legitimate duty. If Darwin could however show that he has none more than contractual duty, he could lay claim to the reward.

If B advertisement is to offer to contact with the first person to come forward. If it is a presentation in person C will succeed because A has not presented himself. If however the communication can be made over the phone or e-mail (something which will turn on the wording of the advertisement itself) then A should succeed in communicating his acceptance first and creating a binding contract before C’s communication has occurred. Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v Commercial and General Investments (1970) If the advertisement is silent on how one is to be the first come, consideration need to be given to what is reasonable in the circumstance. If a telephone number or e-mail are given, it seems likely that these are appropriate method as either system allow a person to determine with certainty who has communicated first in time, it should be clear who has accepted the offer first. In this instance the person is A and a contract is concluded with him before C. B needs to be advised that the resolution of the problem is determined by the wording of her advertisement, in particular, has she included her telephone number and e-mail address and thus held herself out as capable of communication on these grounds? If the China is worth more than three times the advertised price, this should not affect a concluded contract with A or C. The only possible ground for setting aside the contract here would be that there is some fundamental mistake which goes to the root of the contract: here the sale concerns the same china and the only possible misapprehension is the value of the china. Who should succeed in an action for breach of contract? On balance it seems likely that a court will not allow that B’s advertisement is an offer capable of acceptance unless it is clearly worded as such and clearly worded that presentation may occur by e-mail of telephone message because of the commercial inconvenience which can attend a determination that advertisement is an offer. Consequent A will be disappointed in his action because the contract was formed with C and A responded to an advertisement knowing that he might not be the first to come forward. A would not in any event, recover damages for disappointment on the basis of Addis v Gramophone Co. (1909) although candidates would want to consider the line of authorities decided since Malik v BCCI (1997). A would not in any event, recover damages for disappointment on the basis of Addis v Gramophone Co. (1909) although candidates would want to consider the line of authorities decided since Malik v BCCI (1997).

to accept this offer and Bigbytes have refused to allow the completion of this act. A consideration of the decisions in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper (1940) on the one hand and Errington v Errington (1952) and Daulia Ltd v Four Milbank Nominees (1978) on the other hand is required. The issues present some difficulty in its resolution.

To receive extra amount there must be consideration – Stilk v Myrick (1809). Practical Benefit must be established to receive extra benefit – Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (1991) and doubts on the case Re. Selectmove Ltd (1995) and South Caribbean Trading Ltd (SCT) v Trafigura Beeher BV 2004. To determine whether or not terms are certain, the principles established in such cases as Scammel v Ouston (1941) and Hillas v Arcos 1932 are important. It is necessary to consider whether or not Cruisers was estopped from claiming the full amount by reason enunciated by Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Street House Ltd (1947). Can it be said that a promise intended to be binding was made and that Donald acted upon this promise (Donald has not opened the letter). Is it possible that Donald has attempted a variation of the contract by paying only half the price – Pinnel’s case and Foakes v Beer. Edwina had already sent three-quarters of the fee by the time she receives cruisers’ letter. Can it be said she has acted upon Cruisers’ promise or on her own behalf. In the case of Fiona, Cruisers initially fulfils the criteria necessary to bring the situation within the ambit of the principles established in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Street House Ltd (1947). How can Cruisers end the arrangements – The Post Chaser (1982).


Required elements of actionable misrepresentation. Did the offeror say anything to induce the contract? Implicit statement – Spice Girls Ltd v Aprila World Service BV (2000). Operative mistake has the effect of vitiating a contract (Smith v Hughes). Affirmation of a contract in which bars rescission . Is the statement of an agent a misrepresentation? Bisset v Wilkonson; Smith v Land House Corporation. If Lewis is John’s Agent he can take action under Misrepresentation Act 1967 (but no ken as the Act applies only to another party to the contract). Lewis statement may also be actionable as a negligent misstatement within the ambit of Hedley Byrne v Heller The new judicial appointment commission was established under the constitution Reform Act 2005 and commenced operation in April 2006. Effect of a mistake as to the quality of the subject matter in a contract – Bell v Lever Bros. Whether mutual mistake in equity still exists was also relevant to the resolution of the problem (Sole v Butcher, Associated Japanese Bank v Credit du Nord, the Great Peace. Has the performance of the contract been frustrated and is the contract discharged) or was it mere frustration or increase expenses (Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareharm Urban District Council). Doctrine of mistake and frustration

PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND RIGHTS OF THIRD PARIES
Linden Gardens v Lenesta Sludge Disposal (1994) 1 AC 85. Does Gorgon has performance interest in the contract which will be recognised by the courts (Panatown v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd (2000): Radford v DeFroberviller (19977). Common law exception to privity of contract (Darlington B.C. v Wiltshier) and Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. s.1 expressly provided damages and it could be inferred that there is no intent to provide other benefits (Panatown v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd (2000) HL: Third party apparently suffering from a contract they were not a party to. If a loss is not too remote is recoverable (Hadley v Badendale and Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland (2005) UKHL 3) Contract between Gongorn and Iffy to absolve iffy of any liability under the building contract. Can Heracles the third party maintain action against iffy. If the right exist in 1999 Act, the ability to vary the contract is determined by the original contract If Gongor and Iffy agreed in the original contract that this was possible without agreement to Heracles they can modify this contract by subsequent agreement in such a way as to remove any claim by Heracles. If the contract was silent s.2 of the 1999 act will apply

Incorporation of terms into a contract – Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel (1941), Chapleton v Barry UDC (1940), Thorton v Shoe Lane Parking (1971) and Parker v South Eastern Rly (1987). Terms are also implied into contract by reason of s.14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (goods sold in the course of business should be of satisfactory quality. Breach of implied terms and whether express terms cover the breach. Unfair Terms in Consumers Contract Act 1977 (UCTA) [s.1 applies where one party deals in the course of a business or where the parties deal on one party’s standard written terms s.2) and Unfair Terms in Consumers Contract Regulations Act 1999 (UTCCR). Applications of ss. 6 and 12 of UCTAA 1997 and the relevant case law. A business cannot exclude the implied terms arising by operation of SOGA 1979 as against a consumer. Application of ss.2(2), 3, 11, 13, 24, Sch. 2 and the case laws interpreting the sections. 1999 (UTCCR) applied to unfair terms between a seller and supplier on the one hand and consumer on the other s.4(1). Unfair terms principles in Director-General of Fair trading v First National Bank Plc (2002) HL; UTCCR 1999 ss.4-6, Sch.2). Unfair terms are of no effect against a consumer s.8. For a consumer UTCCR 1999 is preferable, because express term are of no effect if unfair to UCTA 1997 which would allow the express terms to the extent that they are reasonable. Because Mary deals as a consumer, the express will not survive the scrutiny and cannot be used by the seller to bring action. Meaning of condition (e.g. Schuler v Wickman Machine Tool Sales (1974) Lombard North Central Finance v Butterworth (1987). If the term is a condition, the perfect produce can terminate the contract for breach the fact that they have not suffered is irrelevant. If the terms is a warranty or innominate, breach of it will only sound in damages and not damages. Term is an innominate term within the decision in Hong Kong Fir Shipping v Kawasaki (1962). Cehave v Bremer HG (The Hansa Nord) 1976 for innominate terms it appears the consequences are not sufficiently serious for termination of the contract.

PRINCIPLES FOR AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

The basic measure of loss is the expectation loss Robinson v Harman (1884). The law seeks to compensate the claimant for his disappointment expectation; it is compensation for loss of a bargain. The English courts have begun to expand the kind of loss to include non-pecuniary matters such as loss of amenity, pain, distress and so forth (e.g. Ruxley Electronics and Contruction v Forsyth (1995), Farley v Skinner, Hamilton Jones v David & Snape (2003). Alternative basis for measuring damages on the reliance loss or loss of expenditure basis (e.g. Anglia Television v Reed (1972). Award for restitutionary losses e.g. an account of profit following House of Lords decision in Attorney General v Blake (2001). Controversy in Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc. 2003. The extent to which the recognition of restitutionary loss threatens to erode the traditional losses measured in terms of expectation and reliance. Nature of award of damages under s.2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 in the light of decision in Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson (1991) in terms of removal of possibility of claim of either negligent misstatement or fraudulent misrepresentation at common law. S.2(1) the claimant need only to establish that a misrepresentation has occurred and the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that they had reasonable ground to believe that the statement was true up to the point of contracting. It is easier to establish a claim of misstatement under Hedley Byrne v Heller, which requires either a duty of care or an assumption of responsibility to be established by the claimant. The comparative ease is assisted by the decision in Royscot Trust v Rogersn which allows a claimant to receive damages measure as if the tort of deceit had been committed. There are reservations about an apparent generousity in the award express in a number of case since Royscot, but a recent decision in Forest International Gaskets Limited v Foster Marketing Limited (2005) the CA refused permission for the issue to be sent on appeal to the House of Lords


Discharge of contracts. Frustrating events. Clarity of organisation requires a) to consider each of the issues in relation to each of the particular contract or consider each of the contracts in the light of the issues. Relevant criteria established for the frustration of a contract by the case law (e.g. Davs Contractors Ltd v Fureham Urban District Council and National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981]. Destruction of the subject matter Taylor v Caldwell (1863). Bay Steam Boat Co v Hutton (1904): it is still possible to perform a significant element of the contracts and that they are therefore not frustrated. For Sam contract, the likelihood is frustration. Bay Steam Boat Co v Hutton (1904) and Krell v Henry (1903) to ascertain whether the existence of the island formed a foundation of the hall hire contract. If the viewing of the multimedia exhibition is an essential element of the overall experience within the meaning of Bay Steam Boat Co v Hutton then the contract with Q, R and 400 customers will not be frustrated. If viewing is only an ancillary element to the view of the island then the contracts will be frustrated. Contract with same is frustrated and it is necessary to examine the application of s.1(1), s.2(5) and the consequence of s.1. It seems the sum are payable to Sam. S.1(2) must be applied to determine the result of frustration. Gamerco SA v ICM/Fair Warning Agency (1995) would be appropriate. S.1(2) may be applied in the case if Q, R and 400 customers if the contracts have been frustrated. If the contracts have not been frustrated, the candidates will need to consider the consequences of a breach of contract, which will sound in damages.


CATEGORISATION OF TERMS IN CONTRACT: WARRANTIES, CONDITIONS OR INNOMINATE TERMS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FROM THE TERMS

Can the contract be terminated or does the breach sound only in damages). The extent to which candidates can establish that a particular term is so important that breach of them entitles the injured party to repudiate the contract (L Schulter v Wickman Machine Tool Sale (1974); Lambeth North Central v Butterworth [1987. Extend to which victim of a breach would not end a contract following the breach of or sufficiently serious innominate term – practical consideration will usually be of commercial nature [expectation of future business in other contracts, long-term relationship or an unwillingness to impede supply). Legal consideration will generally be considered with the claimant’s duty to mitigate his losses (British Westinghouse Electric Co. Ltd v Underground Electric Rys Co of London Ltd (1912) and Payzu v Saunders (1919). person is guilty of theft contrary to s.1 of the Theft Act 1968. s.9(1)(a) – Conditional intention. The question of intention to permanently deprive is a question for the jury to determine. s.6 generally applied to borrowing.

While it may be that Kevin has committed a misrepresentation in entering into the contract with Loopy on the basis of an implicit statement about an existing state of facts (Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Services BV (2000). This is difficult to establish because it is by no means clear that Kevin’s improprieties have occurred before the contract or, if they have, that he is aware that this will have an effect upon the contract or that such a disclosure is imminent.

The central issue is whether or not the contract between Kevin and Loopy has been frustrated. Has there been a supervening event which renders the performance of contract impossible - Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (1956), National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (1981), Tsakiroglou & Co. v Noblee and Thorl (1962) and so forth. Breach of contract – principles in Marine National Fish v Ocean Trawlers (1935) and the Super Servant Two (1990). Law reform (Frustrated contracts) Act 1943. Another issue is whether Kevin’s act amount to a breach (what are the terms of a contract) or whether they constitute frustration. In other words, is this a situation to which the principles in cases such as Maritime National Fish v Ocean Trawlers (1935) and The Super Servant Two (1990) apply? One possibility is that Kevin’s popularity plummets not because of his improprieties but because of his demotion to a lower division team.

Candidates also needed to consider the effect of the application of Law Reform (Frustrated Contract) Act 1943 to this situation. Will Loopy be able to recover the money already paid to Kevin? Has Kevin conferred a benefit upon Loopy through the sales already made before the news is made public?


Candidates need to established that Zesty has breached the contract by failing to deal with the subterranean rivers and springs on Wendy’s property Once the breach is establish, there is need to establish remedies available to Wendy and the extent to which the aw will recompense Wendy with damages. Wendy’s losses are twofold – the first set are those related to her annual garden party. Two sub-problem arise: these are non-financial losses arising from loss of enjoyment and this irrecoverable or can they be recovered (cases such as Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd (1909), Jarvis v Swans Tour (1973), Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth (1996), Malik v BCCI (1991), and Hamilton Jones V David & Snape (2003). The second sub-problem is whether some of the losses pertaining to the garden party are too remote to be recovered (Hadley v Baxendale (1854), Victoria Laundry (Windsor) v Newman Industries (1949), The Heron II (1969) and H Parsons (Livestock) v Uttley Ingham (1978). It is also useful to mention whether contract between Wendy and Zesty conferred an enforceable benefit upon Wendy’s party guests under the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999 or the principle of Jackson v Horizon Holidays. The second problem Wendy faces is the measures of damages recoverable with regard to the repairs of her property. It may be that she lost an amenity within the meaning of Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth (1996) but that she is unable to recover the cost of the repairs.


Consideration of the purpose behind an award of damages for a breach of contract and a comparison of the different purpose contract fulfil.

Recent cases of damages which has moved from Addis v Gramaphone & Co. such as Jarvis v Swan Tours (1973); Ruxlyy Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth (1996); Malik v BCCI (1997); Farly v Skinner (2001), Watts v Morrow (1991) and Hamilton Jones v David & Snape (2003). Analysis of the central problem of whether or not the law of contract should, as a matter of principle, compensate for losses which were not commercial one in the context of non-commercial contract. Contracts Regulation (UTCCA) 1999 (which apply by reason of regulation 4 and 5 the interpretation place upon this by the House of Lords in Director-General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc (2002). The term is listed in the blacklist in Schedule 2, 1(a) in relation to death or personal or personal injury. The term is of no effect (Reg. 8). Term (ii), also is in apparent contravention of both the 1997 Act and 1999 Regulations. The term reserves right to Ultraclean to alter pick up time without notice - S.3(2) imposes a requirement of reasonableness on this term is also likely within 1(k) of the 1999 regulation thus not binding on the consumer. Term (iii) is similar in purpose to clause (ii); attempt to provide a different service that the one contracted for) and is covered by the same provision in the 1977 Act and 1999 regulations. Term (iv) would be valid under the 1997 Act only to the extent that it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness and fits within the list of unfair terms in Schedule 2, notably 1(1) and this not being upon a consumer. If Thomas has engaged Ultraclean to remove the laundry of his Dental Practice then the 1999 regulations would not apply because Thomas is no longer a consumer but a business (Reg. 4(1) and Reg. 3(1). The 1997 Act would still apply if the court determines that Thomas still deals as a consumer in regard to the clauses potentially within s.3(and the situation is not entirely clear here, see R&B Customs Brokers, Stevenson v Rogers, and Feldaroll Foundry Plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd (2004) or if the parties deals on Ultraclean’s written standard terms of business (St. Albans City District Council v International Computers Ltd (1996).

The nature of contract entered between Hack and Ida Were the terms set out in the question incorporated into the contract? On the basis of L’Estrange v Graucob, the answer appear to be yes. Were the terms relevant to the problem that later arose? If they are relevant were the term permitted under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulation 1999. The later would be inapplicable because Hack seems to be acting in the course of a business. Is the unfair the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applicable? Candidates need to consider the particular terms to establish this. Clause (i) appear incompatible with s.6 of UCTA and raises the question of whether Hack deals as a consumer or not – R & B Customs Brokers v UDT and Stevenson v Rogers. Hacks deals as a consumer, the act is not permissible. he is not dealing as a consumer, the clause is valid if reasonable. ause (ii) needs to be scrutinised for possible non-compliance with s.2(2). ause (iii) may be incompatible with s.3. ndidates needs assure themselves that either Hacks deals as a consumer or that the parties deals on Ida’s standard written terms of business and that clause is reasonable in the circumstances.


Marvin enter into two contracts in January and both were disrupted by events in February. The nature of events present fundamental different issues in contract law. Has the first contract been breached by them (e.g. Universal Cargo Carriers Corp v Cittati). If it has been breached what rights is Marvin entitled to – Damages for loss of employment because the purpose of the contract was employment (Jarvis v Swan Tours (1973); Jacksons vs Horizon Holidays (1975); Farley v Skinner (2001). Can Marvin recover damages on behalf of his guest (Pantown v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd (2002). Interaction of Marvin’s contract with the Noughts and his contract with Opeair Ltd. If the second contract has been frustrated, the first contract has to be frustrated because Noughts had to be flown to the Island on Openair flight. Principle relating to frustration (Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council (1956); National Carriers Ltd V Panalpina (Northern Ltd (1981). Mere increase expense does not amount to frustration. But the increase is three times the original cost and the code is not in place at the required time. What were the right in the event that the contract would not be frustrated – are Openair action a form of economic duress (Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v Hyndai Construction Co. Ltd, North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v Hyndai Construction Co. Ltd). If they refused to fly because of increase cost, this is breach of contract. The better view is to whether the contract is frustrated or not is that is that wit is or will be frustrated – Law Reform (Frustrated Contract) Act 1943


Various issues of illegality in the formation of a contract and the extent to which courts will enforce a contract despite the taint of illegality. Illegality is created by statute. Consider the purpose behind the statutory requirement. Following John Shipping v Rank, the issue to be considered in the purpose behind the statute. Is the statute intended to penalise conduct or prohibit contract? Definitely not to prohibit contract! The requirement to provide an invoice appears to regulate the conduct of business rather than the legality if business. The above will indicated that contracts which do not comply with this requirement are illegal as performed rather than as formed. Parts a & b deals with similar situations. Monty may be innocent of wrongdoing in that he inadvertently failed to supply Norman with the statutory invoice and was unaware of the illegality. In some circumstances, courts have allowed such contract to be enforced (cf Archbolds (Freightage) v Spanglett); in other cases, courts have not allowed the contract to be enforced (cf Re Mahmoud and Ispahani). Where statute does not specify the consequences of illegality on contract, the better view is that the effect should be determined by reference to the statute. Here it is arguable that the purposes of the statute would not be further by denying Monty the remuneration due under his agreement with Norman. Monty would be able to recover on a quantum valebat basis for the goods supplied (Mohammed v Alaga) but not if public policy would prevent such a restitutionary recovery (Awwad v Geraghty & Co.). Similar situation prevail upon the situation in part B. Part c raises a subtle difference because both parties appear to be aware of the need to supply an invoice and have agreed not to in this instanced. Both Paul and Monty are aware that the contract is illegal because it lacks the statutory invoice. Both are assenting to a performance that they know is illegal. The parties are in pari delicto and neither can sue on the contract. Monty cannot obtain the remuneration stipulated in the agreement. In part d: Quinn is apparently unaware that he invoice is required by law. The consideration in a) and b) are relevant. In this instance, Quinn appears to be an innocent party to the illegal contract. In part (e), Monty licence as expired and the contract is illegal as formed and thus unenforceable by either party.

One of the express terms in the contract is that Ultraclean will use certain types of soap powder. The law will imply a term into a contract that a contract for services is discharge with reasonable skill. Has Ultraclean succeeded in this endeavour by printing the terms on the reverse side of the collection slip. Such notice must be given before the time of the contract (Olley v Marlborough Court (1949) and it must be embodied in a document of ‘contractual force’ (Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council (1940) and appropriate notice of exclusion clause must be given (Parker v South Eastern Railway (1877) . Extra notice must be given of onerous or unusual terms (Spurling v Bradshaw (1956) and Interfoto Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd (1989) (terms iii and iv). It seems the exclusion clauses are incorporated into the contract. The law regulates contractual terms through Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) 1977 and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation (UTCCA) 1999. The 1977 Act applies where a party attempts to exclude liabilities arising in the context of a business s.1. Term (i) cannot extend to personal injury or death caused by negligence by reason of s.2(1) and in the case of other loss or damage caused by negligence, liability can only be restricted to the extent that it is reasonable s.2(2). Term (i) contravenes Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation (UTCCA) 1999 (which apply by reason of regulation 4 and 5 the interpretation place upon this by the House of Lords in Director-General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc (2002). The term is listed in the blacklist in Schedule 2, 1(a) in relation to death or personal or personal injury. The term is of no effect (Reg. 8). Term (ii), also is in apparent contravention of both the 1997 Act and 1999 Regulations. The term reserves right to Ultraclean to alter pick up time without notice - S.3(2) imposes a requirement of reasonableness on this term is also likely within 1(k) of the 1999 regulation thus not binding on the consumer. Term (iii) is similar in purpose to clause (ii); attempt to provide a different service that the one contracted for) and is covered by the same provision in the 1977 Act and 1999 regulations. Term (iv) would be valid under the 1997 Act only to the extent that it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness and fits within the list of unfair terms in Schedule 2, notably 1(1) and this not being upon a consumer. If Thomas has engaged Ultraclean to remove the laundry of his Dental Practice then the 1999 regulations would not apply because Thomas is no longer a consumer but a business (Reg. 4(1) and Reg. 3(1). The 1997 Act would still apply if the court determines that Thomas still deals as a consumer in regard to the clauses potentially within s.3(and the situation is not entirely clear here, see R&B Customs Brokers, Stevenson v Rogers, and Feldaroll Foundry Plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd (2004) or if the parties deals on Ultraclean’s written standard terms of business (St. Albans City District Council v International Computers Ltd (1996).

Consideration of terms of contract between Lag and Morgan and the permissibility of these terms under the law. The nature of the statements and advertising given by Ivana to James. Were they warranties of representation: Heilbut, Symons &Co. v Buckelton (1913). If they were warranties of breach of them sounds in damages. If they were misrepresentation liability attached to them only in the event that they were misrepresentations. Morgan ahs sought to exclude liability for any misrepresentation by clause (i). In this case s.3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 is applicable and such an exemption can only be made to the extent that is reasonable. Similar consideration to clause (ii). Clause (iii) appears to seek to exclude liability for any implied terms as to the condition of the vehicle. Because Morgan sells the car in the course of a business, s.14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies. By reasons of s.6(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Morgan cannot exclude or restrict s.14 of the s.14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Clause (iv) would not appear to be effective because it contravenes s.2(1) of the UCTA 1977 to the extent that it seek to exclude liability for personal injury or death. In the event that it seek to exclude liability for damage to property, this is permissible to the extent that the clause is reasonable: s.2(2). Clause (v) meets with the same conditions. While some of these clauses may withstand scrutiny under the UCTA 1977, they are unlikely, given the House of Lords’ decision in Director-General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc (2002), to withstand a challenge under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (UTCCR) 1999. If Lag dealt in the course of business, the 1999 regulation would not apply. Under the UCTA 1977, the matters covered in s.6(2) can only be excluded to the extent that they are reasonable. S.6(3) consideration as to the requirements of reasonability are thus necessary.